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The More-Electric Aircraft (MEA) is a type of aircraft that replaces conventional 
hydraulic and pneumatic systems with electrically powered components. These 
changes have significantly challenged the aircraft electric power system design. This 
thesis investigates how reliability analysis can be applied to automatically generate 
system topologies for the MEA electric power system. We first use a traditional 
method of reliability block diagrams to analyze the reliability level on different 
system topologies. We next propose a new methodology in which system topologies, 
constrained by a set reliability level, are automatically generated. The path-set 
method is used for analysis. Finally, we interface these sets of system topologies with 
control synthesis tools to automatically create correct-by-construction control logic 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
1.1Thesis Overview 
 
Increasing reliance on electric power systems has recently become popular in overall 
aircraft design. The increasing used of electric power systems in aircraft design had 
increased the level of Safety-criticality in an aircraft electric power system. Unlike 
traditional hydraulic systems, the electric power system is more flexible in design and 
weighs less, thus reducing fuel consumption. More subsystems now rely on electric 
power, demanding we guarantee the safety of every aircraft while at the same time 
trying to design a system that is much more complex. This thesis investigates how 
reliability analysis can be applied to the automatically generated candidate system 
topologies for the More-Electric Aircraft (MEA) electric power system.  Topologies 
are linked to control synthesis techniques that automatically construct controllers to 
actuate contactors in order to provide power to buses and loads. this design a 
controller to actuate contactors in order to provider power to the buses and loads.  The 
goal of this thesis is to select a reliable number of electric components and the 
connectivity between electric power components that will produce a consistent 
reliability level. Reliability is the ability of a system or a product to operate under 
calculated operating conditions for a designed life cycle [19]. In the next section, we 
describe MEA and how they differ from the traditional aircraft.  
1.2 More-Electric Aircraft (MEA) 
 
The MEA replaces traditional hydraulic and pneumatic systems with electrically 







the hydraulic and pneumatic system.  Instead of controlling the system with 
hydraulic, pneumatic and mechanical systems, the MEA is controlled by high-speed 
electric motors [3]. When the plane is lighter, it requires less fuel to maintain the 
operation. This also means it can fly faster and be more fuel efficient (because less 
thrust is required to balance this smaller drag from less weight) [12]. Current MEA 
models include the F-35 Fighter, Airbus A380, and Boeing 787 [37].  
The concept of the electric aircraft has been around since the 1940’s but due to the 
lack of electric power capabilities, it did not become popular until recently [10]. 
Figure 1 compares the electric generation and distribution on a traditional aircraft 
with a MEA (Boeing 787). As it can be seen from Figure 1, the traditional airplane 
has only one generator on each of the two main engines and one generator on the 
auxiliary power unit [5]. Boeing 787 has two generators on each engine and two 
generators on the auxiliary power unit.  
 
Figure 1. A comparison between the electric generation and distribution on a 







Despite MEA’s benefits, it also creates new uncertainties. Replacing the hydraulic 
pneumatic system, mechanical system and subsystem with the electric equivalents 
system, there is more components need to be controlled, and more subsystems 
interact with each other because they all rely on electric power. Finding errors, or 
sequences of events leading to errors, is difficult.  
In summary, to compare the traditional and the more advanced electric system, we 
will examine the differences electric power system between Boeing 777 and Boeing 
787.  
1.2.1 Traditional Power System 
 
On a traditional airplane, the power is extracted from the engines in two different 
ways:  
• Engine-driven generators, which power the electrical system. 
• Diverting hot, high-energy air from the engines into the pneumatic system. 
Each engine has one generator, which spins when the engine is running to produce 
electrical power. The pneumatic system, also known as a “bleed-air” system, bleeds 
air off the engines to power other systems [37].  
For example, Boeing 777 has a twin engine with each engine having a 120-kVA 
generator. This is one 120-kVA Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) driven generator with 








1.2.2 More-Electric Power System 
 
The 787 Dreamliner uses electricity, not pneumatics, to power airplane systems and 
relies on electricity more than any other Boeing airplane [37]. Unlike other models, 
electricity on board the 787 powers things such as environmental controls, engine 
start-up, hydraulics and wing ice prevention [37]. This innovative “bleedless” system 
provides many benefits over pneumatic systems. These benefits include: (i) 
Eliminates heavy ducts, valves and controls, (ii) Eliminates maintenance associated 
with pneumatic systems, and (iii) Extracts significantly less energy from the engines. 
For example, Boeing 787 has adopted the three-phase 230 VAC electric-power 
instead of the conventional three-phase 115 VAC arrangement that Boeing usually 
uses. This increases the voltage by a 2:1 factor and decreases the feeder losses in the 
electrical distribution system, which allows significant wiring reduction. There are 
two 250 kVA generators per engine and two 225 kVA APU mounted generators. In 
addition, Boeing 787 also powers 230 VAC loads and the electrical power is 
converted into 115 VAC and 28 VDC power to feed into other sub-systems that need 
power supplies [20].  
Because there are thousands of components in an aircraft, the connectivity between 
components can be very complex. In this thesis, our primary goal is to generates 
topologies with a given reliability level. In the next section, we present the electric 









1.3 Electric Power System Components 
 
Depending on the manufacturer, each electric power system component has various 
reliability rates, and placing them in different positions at the electrical circuits can 
lead to different reliability of the eclectic power system. Placing the components in a 
different position implies connecting the components in different way. We considered 
having the components connected with others in a series, parallel or complex format. 
A complex system is one that is neither series nor parallel, nor parallel-series.  
A main focus of this thesis is to study the different reliability levels that result from 
different connectivity of the components. The topologies formed by the electric 
power components were mainly connected as a complex system, which included 
components both in series and parallel. The topologies here in this thesis were 
composed of a set of components with different component combinations. Although 
an MEA had thousands of components, in this thesis, for the purpose of simplicity we 
scaled down the number of components to ranges of six to eight components. The 
following is a brief description of the electric power components found in an electric 
power system.  
Generators: Generators are connected to engines and can operate in high or low 
voltages. For example, the AC generator for Boeing 787 is 235 VAC while the DC 
generators are 270 VDC. 
Buses: Buses deliver power to loads or power conversion equipment. More 
sophisticated electrical systems usually include multiple voltage systems with a 







Contactors: A contactor is an electrically controlled switch used to switch a power 
circuit. Contactors provide the actuation for reconfiguration of the topology’s electric 
power system; hence, changing the paths through which power is delivered from 
generators to loads depends on the contingencies [35,36]. 
Transformer Rectifier Units: Transformers will step down a voltage level. 
Rectifiers will convert AC power to DC power. A transformer rectifier unit can do 
both.  
Batteries: Batteries are used to provide emergency backup power to avionics 
equipment and provide ground power capability for maintenance and preflight 
checkouts. 
RAM Air Turbine: The RAM Air Turbine (RAT) is an emergency device that 
provides backup electrical and hydraulic power when there is a loss of multiple main 
generators [35].  
Overall this section introduces the different type of electric power component and 
each component is part of the system.  Placing each component in different position 
can affect the overall system’s reliability level.  In this section, we introduced all the 
components in an electric power system, and this is the reliability rate for the overall 
system calculated. In the next section, we describe the system requirements and how 
it affects the safety.   
1.4 Reliability Requirements 
 
The basic reliability requirement for the designer is that no single failure can cause 







demonstrate a capability that fulfills a probability of failure less than 10!! per flight 
hours, which mean no single failure can occur within  10!! flight hours. In this thesis, 
we mainly focus on the catastrophic failure. This means that the system designer will 
be required to implement fail-safe features in the design, and it will have to 
demonstrate the appropriate analysis that the design is capable of meeting or 
exceeding a probability of failure less than 10!! per flight hours [20, 24]. Examples 
of catastrophes will be the loss of an aircraft, wings cut off, cabin pressurization, etc. 
– anything that prevents a pilot from saving the aircraft.  
Calculating correctly the reliability level plays an important role in designing the 
electric power systems. In the next section, we present the reliability analysis methods 
we used in this thesis.  
1.5 Reliability Analysis Methods 
 
We performed the system reliability analysis into two different procedures. In the first 
procedure, different reliability methods were used to calculate a given electric power 
system topology. The second procedure automatically generated candidate system 
topologies that could potentially meet the reliability requirement.  In these two design 
procedures, we applied RBD and path-set method to the calculations.  
In the traditional method calculation, we primarily used the Reliability Block 
Diagram (RBD) to develop topologies. RBD’s are models that are used to analyze the 
performance of the system, and RBD primarily depends on its physical arrangements.  
During the proposed method calculation, we used a method call ‘path-set’ to calculate 







1.5.1 General Equations to Calculate MTBF 
 
Calculations of MTBF assume that a system is ‘renewed’, i.e. fixed, after each failure, 
and then returned to service immediately after failure [19]. The average time between 
failing and being returned to service is termed Mean Down Time. As shown in Figure 
2, the definition of MTBF is the sum of the operational period (“start of down time” 
subtract “start of up time”) divided by the number of observed failures.  
 
 
Figure 2. Definition of Mean Time between Failures (where MTBF is the sum of the 
operational period (“Start of down time” subtract “start of up time”) divided by the 
number of observed failures) 







Where 𝑇! is the start of down time, 𝑇! is the start of up time and F! was the number of 
observed failures.  
 
1.5.2 Reliability Black Diagram 
 
A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) performs the system reliability and availability 







relationships. It has frequently been used to model the effect of a failure item on a 
system’s performance. We can separate Reliability Block Diagrams into three 
different types [19]:  
a. In series (when all of the blocks work, the system works): 
b. In parallel (System fails when all blocks fail)  
c. Complex systems – parallel-series system, but most systems are a 
combination of the two.  
We can analyze a complex system or parallel-series system by dividing it into its 
basic parallel and series modules and then determining the reliability function for 
each module. Figure 3 shows a simplified RBD for an aircraft electric power system.  
Figure 3. Simplified RBD for an Aircraft Electric Power System 
We used different type of complex system method in our proposed method, and this 
type of complex system is either parallel or series, but exhibits some hybrid 
combination of the two. This type of system uses a more computationally intensive 
method to determine the reliability involved with the use of path-set and cut-set 







Compared cut-set and path-set methods, path-set method makes calculation simpler in 
this thesis.  RBD suitable apply to topologies that are neatly laid out in series, parallel 
or parallel-series only. Topologies generated in our proposed method displays hybrid 
combination of series and parallel. Therefore we used path-set methods for 
calculations.   
A path-set is a set of units that forms a connection between input and output when 
traversed in the direction of the reliability block diagram arrows. Thus, a set merely 
represents a “path” through the graph. A cut set is a set of system elements that, when 
removed from the system, interrupts all connections between the input and output 
ends of the system. A minimum cut sets contains no other cut sets within it [19].  
 
Figure 4. Simplified Path-Set for an Aircraft Electrical Power System 
 
As shown in Figure 4, there are three paths that can go from input to output and each 
path follows the direction of an arrow. Path one passes through generator 1 and 
Generator control unit (GCU) 1 while path two passes through generator 2 and GCU 







from the airstream by ram pressure due to the speed of the aircraft. Each of these 
paths has their own reliability level, and we can find it on the system reliability level 
by multiplying it.  
After going through different type of reliability analysis methods, we are now ready 
to apply these methods to our designs. In the following chapter, we present the two 
different methodologies we used in this thesis.   
1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
In this thesis, we present different methods to investigate system topology options for 
MEA electric power system. We use a traditional methodology to calculate the 
reliability rate for an electric power system, and propose a new methodology to 
generate topologies for a given reliability level. We also present the different 
reliability methods to find the reliability level for different topologies. The reliability 
method in the traditional methodology is RBD, while we apply put-set methods in the 
proposed methodology. MATLAB and Python are used for calculations in the two 
methodologies. Chapter 2 presents the methods in both traditional and proposed 
methodologies while Chapter 3 and 4 describe the step-by-step procedure for both 
methods. Chapter 5 discusses the formal specification in synthesizing the control 
protocols and distributed controller for selected cases. Discussion, evaluation and 








Chapter 2: System Design Methodologies 
 
In our design methodologies, we consider two processes, which are the traditional and 
the new proposed process. In the traditional design method, we look at the 
requirement for an aircraft’s electric power system and then select the electric power 
components. Within those electric power components, different brand’s components 
have different reliability values. In this thesis, the reliability value for each type of 
component is a constant. Selecting the number of components becomes very 
important when we calculate the overall reliability level for the electric power system. 
Failure of one component can cause a failure of the entire system. In addition, the 
connectivity of the components plays an important role in calculating reliability.  
Placing each component in series or parallel, it affects its overall reliability level. We 
applied the RBD into the analysis and calculations.  For the topologies that did not 
meet the FAA reliability level requirement, we redesigned them. In this process of 
design, we aimed to develop a topology that would be the reliable choice for the 
number of components and their connectivity.  
For the proposed design method, we looked at the overall reliabilities for the electric 
power system and automatically generated a set of candidate topologies that met the 
reliability level. We applied complex system method into the analysis and 
calculations of the reliability level. We created a set of candidate topologies by using 
all the possible combinations of component quantities. Within the set of candidate 
topologies, we then applied constraints to the topologies. The first constraints limited 







component from each type of electric power component was required (e.g. at least 
one generator was required for each topology). There were also constraints on the 
connection points between components, such as a generator that cannot connect to 
another generator.  
2.1 Traditional Methodology 
 
The traditional way to determine the reliability level of a system, such as cars, 
aircrafts and buildings, is by testing the reliability level of each components system 
and their behaviors in the system. Knowing the reliability values of each component, 
we can calculate the reliability level of the whole system.  In this thesis, the reliability 
values come from industry tested values obtained from numerous tests, which have 
increased the reliability of the values [20].  Next, it is to develop topologies, here we 
are determining the reliability level of a topology by placing the components in 
different positions, such as in series, parallel or a mix of series and parallel. We then 
calculate the reliability level of each topology. In this procedure, we applied the 
Reliability Black Diagram (RBD) to the analysis and used MATLAB as our tool to 
calculate the reliability. If the overall reliability level does not reach the required level 
of safety determined by the FAA, then the topology must be redesigned. 
2.1.1 Reliability Values 
 
The reliability level of each component in this thesis has been selected based on its 
reasonable value from industries, since different providers have provided different 
reliability levels for each component. The reliability level used for each component is 







Table 1. MTBF values for components [20] 
Component Symbol MTBF Value (per flight hours) 
Generator G/g 5.0×10!! 
Bus B/b 7.0  ×10!! 
Conactor C/c 1  ×10!! 
Group power units GCU 2.0  ×10!! 
Rectifier R 1.0  ×10!! 
 
2.1.2 Designed in Redundancy 
 
Redundancy is a common approach to improve the reliability and availability of a 
system. In system design, redundancy duplicated the components or functions of a 
system; this increased the reliability level of the safety-critical system. For electric 
power system design, applying redundancy in the electric power system means 
having more than one components of each electric component (e.g. two generators) in 
the system to increase the reliability of the system. In many safety-critical systems, 
such as hydraulic systems in the aircraft, it will be applied the triply which is formally 
termed triple modular redundancy. Within the existing aircraft, Boeing 787 and 
Airbus 380 applied the triple redundant in their hydraulic system. In a triply 
redundant system, the system has three sub components, all three of which must fail 
before the system fails [29]; which increased the reliability level.  
Adding redundancy into the design, however, increase the cost and complexity of the 
system. Yet, if the cost of failure is high enough, redundancy may be an option to the 
system design. Figure 5 is an example of a topology that has applied redundancy into 
the design and the final outcome of the topology is  4.9  ×10!!"  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠. It 
means that the failure rate of the system is  4.9  ×10!!" per flight hours. It also means 







requirement, the values also imply that the system has extra components. 
Overlooking other constraints by focusing on only the MTBF values, we will like to 
get a topology that has a MTBF value that can be as close to the requirement 
(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 = 1  ×10!!  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠) as possible. From this, we come to conclusion 
that the topology we design should apply redundancy in our electric power system 
design. This means that we should have at least two components for each important 
electric power components (e.g. two generators).  
 
Figure 5. Sample Topology Design in Redundancy 
 
The traditional method was presented in this section. In the next section, we present 
the opposite direction method which is proposed method.  
 
2.2 Proposed Methodology 
 
In the new proposed process, instead of developing topologies and determining their 







candidate topologies that satisfies the requirements. To begin with, we generate a set 
of all possible combination topologies, which means generating all different 
combinations for the chosen number of components. After we generate all 
combinations, we will eliminate the one that has zero components of any electric 
power components. Next, based on the characteristic of each electric power 
components, we define its behavior constraints. For example, we want to avoid 
connections between two generators, and generator connecting to bus or bus 
connecting to generator. Right after we apply the behavior constraints to the 
components, we select the number of connections between components. The more 
edges in a topology, the better its reliability level. Therefore, we want to correctly 
select the number of connections between components.  
Last but not least, we apply path-set methods to calculate the reliability level of each 
topology. To do this, we first want to define the input and output components, 
followed by finding all possible paths between input and output. Each path represents 
a level of reliability and the more paths a topology has, the higher its reliability level. 
Python is used to generate topologies and calculate reliability levels.  
Within the reliable topologies, we also want to eliminate the topologies that have 
worsening effects for the overall system. The worsening effect means increasing the 
weight of the aircraft and the cost of the system. In general, the reliability level is 
proportional to the cost as shown in Figure 6, the higher the reliability, the higher cost 
will be [24]. The topologies generated by the tool not only look at its reliability level 
but also the topology that is low in cost. Comparing the cost with the reliability level, 







with a reliability system level right at the reliability index, which comprehensive the 
required reliability level and total cost.  The best sets of topologies are the ones 
balanced in cost and reliability level.  
 
Figure 6. Total Reliability costs where the investment and operating costs can be 
represented by curve RC, outage cost represented by curve OC. The total cost curve 
TC is the sum of the individual cost overs RC and OC. Total cost presents a minimum 







Chapter 3: Traditional Design Method Using RBD 
 
In this chapter, our primary focus is to determine the total number and combination of 
components that gives a reliability level that meets the FAA reliability requirement 
(10!!  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠). Also, we want to define the reliability difference when 
placing the components in different positions. We begin by looking at the reliability 
values for each component and develop topologies that meet the FAA reliability 
requirement. In order to simplify the procedure, the electric power components 
selected are generators, buses, and contactors. Also, in order to simplify the 
calculation, we consider the reliability values for the same type of components that 
remain the same throughout the entire thesis work. For example, we consider the 
reliability value of a generator is 5.0×10!!  (MTBF is   2000  flight hours). All 
generators in this thesis use 5.0×10!!  as a reliability value.  
In electric circuits, parallel circuit is safer and more reliable than series connections 
[19]. Selecting the best number of components that give a reliability level to meet the 
requirement and at the same time weighing the least also plays an important role in 
this thesis. In finding topologies, we apply Reliability Black Diagram (RBD) into the 
analysis. If the overall reliability level does not reach the required level of safety 
determined by the FAA, the topology must be redesigned. 
In the below MATLAB code, first, we give an abbreviation for all electric 
components, such as using G abbreviated generator, B abbreviated bus, C abbreviated 
contactor, GCU abbreviated group power unit and the final reliability value 







units; we define the first generator as G1 while the second generator as G2. We did 
the same for the other components.  For components in series, we add them together; 
while those components in parallel, we multiply them. Finally, reliability for the 
simple calculation of an aircraft electrical power system is shown in the last row, 
which is equal to 4.9 e -10 (𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 = 4.9  ×10!!" per flight hours). This matches the 
reliability value we find in the RBD. Now, we are ready to conduct the next step, 
which is to develop topologies that fulfill the reliability requirements. In the next 
section, we present sample topologies that develop by applying reliability methods 
and show in RBD.  
3.1 Sample Topologies 
 
Figures 7 to 12 show the sample topologies that we create. All topologies from this 
set meet the reliability requirements with some exceeding the reliability level.  As can 
be seen from Figure 7 to 12, placing the components in parallel format increases the 
reliability level while placing the components in a series format leads to a lower 
reliability level. Comparing topologies from Figure 7 and 8, they both lay in a 
parallel-series format, and the reliability values for both topologies are met the 
reliability level. In these two topologies, we place the components in parallel; this 
guarantees the reliability level. For example, system failures only occur if all 
components in a same branch (such as all generators or buses) have failures. The only 
difference between Topology A and B was that Topology B has one less generator 
than Topology A. Comparing topologies A and B, Topology B was better than 







requirement, which means that it is closer to the reliability index. Two, both 
Topology A and B meet the FAA requirements while Topology B has a lighter 
weight. In aircraft design, we want to minimize all unnecessary extra material. A 
regular generator weighs around 200 to 300 pounds. An extra generator increases the 
cost and weight. However, several generators can supply a bigger load, but the 
minimum of two generators is necessary to maintain a successful operation. 
 
 
Figure 7. Topology A 
 
 










Figure 9. Topology C 
 












Figure 12. Topology F 
Comparing topologies in Figure 8 and 9 (topology C with topology B), we reduce a 
set of components in topology C and still place them in a series-parallel format. Even 
though C has fewer components, its reliability level is higher B. The main reason 
topology C had a higher reliability than topology B was topology C has applied the 
triplicate redundancy into the design while topology is not. Topologies in Figure 10, 
11, and 12, topology D, E and F are simply applied in a complex system to all 
components with the reliability level at the highest level when the system has the 
highest number of components in the parallel. As is mentioned in Chapter 2, system 
design, reliability level and total cost are relatively, higher reliability means the 
higher the cost. Therefore a good desirable topology is the one that meets its system 










Chapter 4: Proposed Design Procedure Using Python and Path-
set Method 
 
In this chapter, we investigate a “set of topologies” option for the electric power 
system.  These topologies were automatically generated using NetworkX. NetworkX 
is a Python software package that studies graphs and networks [40]. Each graph is a 
collection of nodes connected with edges. Consider a topology as a graph G = (N, E) 
where N is the nodes and E is the edges. The set N of nodes in the graph contains the 
following components: generator (g), buses (b) and contactors (c). The set E are the 
solid wire links between components [43]. Sample topologies generated by 
NetworkX are shown below in Figure 13.  
 
                 (a)                                                                  (b) 
Figure 13. Sample Topologies Generated by NetworkX.  (a) Six components with 
eight edges – two generators, three buses and two contactors. (b) Eight components 
with ten edges – two generator, two buses and four contactors. 
 
In the topologies of this thesis, we were interested in the reliability level of the 
generators, buses and contactors. These electrical components represent some of the 
key features of the aircraft's electric power system, and fewer components simplified 







industries as shown in [20]. These values can be varied based on the different brand 
of components. There are thousands of electric components in an aircraft, for clarity 
of analysis and ease for the reader, we aimed to develop a set of topologies that had 
the least number of components but that resulted in a reliability level that met the 
FAA requirements. Therefore, we scale down the number of components and mainly 
focused on the six and eight components combinations in the process.  
4.1 Constraints 
 
In order to eliminate any physically impossible or unsuitable topologies, we include a 
set of additional constraints into the design process.  
4.1.1 Components (nodes) 
 
We initially input the total number of components. Within these set of combinations, 
we eliminated the combinations in which there were zero elements of one particular 
component. For example, for the combination that has zero generator, bus or 
contactor, we will eliminate that combination. This will leave us with a set of 
component combinations with at least one component of each electric power 
component. For example, in the six components event, there are a total of 28 sets of 
combinations, and these combinations are 015, 420, 501, 222, and etc. 
In each combination, where the first position denotes the number of generator, the 
second position denotes the number of bus and the third position denotes the number 
of contractor.  







• e.g. 222 = 2 generators, 2 buses and 2 contractors  
From this, we eliminated the set of combination from 28 sets to 10 sets for the six 
components event.  
4.1.2 Edges 
 
Edges between components determine connectivity and the flow of electricity. 
Generally, we do not want to connect two generators in a series. We want generators 
connect it in parallel. Connecting two generators in parallel allows one generator to 
continue its operation even if the other generator failed. This increased the reliability 
level of the electric power system [41].  Contactors are power switches that controlled 
the flow of power and establish the connections between components while the 
electricity is output at the buses. As a result, we want contactors in between 
generators and buses [16, 32, 35]. Combined with the previous electric power 
components characteristics, we had defined a set of false edges. The edges that 
connect the components that we did not want to be connected were defined as false 
edges. These false edges were: 
i. Edges between generator and generator 
ii. Edges between generator and bus  
Possible edges are ones that connect generators with contactors, contactors with 
contactors, and contactors with buses. Each set of components have a maximum 
number of possible edges. For example, for a combination that has two generators, 
two buses, and two generators, the maximum possible edges are nine. In this thesis, 







and the highest number of edges we can use is the maximum possible edges for that 
example. Within the different numbers of edges, it generates a different set of 
topologies. Within the same conditions, it generates a number of possible topologies. 
Figure 14 shows the sample topologies that are connected by different number of 
edges for the two generators, two buses and two contactors event.  
 
 
Figure 14. Example topologies for the two generators, two buses, and two contactors 
events connected with different number of edges. 
 
 From the example topologies shown in Figure 14, we identified that for the six 
components events, we needed at least six edges to connect all components together. 







topologies that had components that were not connected with other components (e.g. 
(1) to (5) in Figure 14). The edges in each topology that physically function as wires 
will connect to each electric power component. Electricity cannot flow to the 
components that are not connected. In this thesis, we applied path-set method to 
calculate the reliability level. In reliability analysis, path-set is a method where we 
find all paths through the topology starting from the input to the output. Different 
number of edges generates different set of paths, and the more paths a topologies 
forms, the higher the reliability level reached. Next, we compared the reliability level 
of different topologies that were composed by different number of edges and 
components.  
 
4.2 Reliability Calculations 
 
In this section, we first presented topologies that were composed by different number 
of edges with the same number of components (e.g. five, six, seven, eight, and nine 
edges for the events to have two generators, two buses and two contactors). 
Subsequently, we compared the topologies with the same total number of components 
but different number of each type of components (e.g. two generators, two buses, and 
two contactors are compared with events that have two generators, three buses and 
one contactor). Following, we presented topologies that were composed by different 
total number of components (e.g. six components vs. eight components). Lastly, we 
presented topologies that were composed with same number of components, same 
edges but different connectivity. In order to calculate the reliability level for each 







this chapter, the electricity that flows through the generators and output at the buses. 
Therefore, generators are the inputs while the buses are the outputs.  
Each topology can have more than one path-set; while each path-set can have 
multiple paths that can pass through from input to output. The number of generators 
and buses determines the number of path-sets. For instance, a topology has a set of 
components that have two generators and one bus; this topology will have two path-
sets (i.e. g1 to b1 and g2 to b1). The reliability for each path-sets are independent 
from each other; consequently, we want to select a topology that has multiple path-
sets and that each path-sets meet the requirement reliability level (𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦   𝑅 =
10!!  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠) or higher.  
To start, we compared the reliability level composed by different number of edges. 
Figure 15 shows topologies with a total number of six components (two generator, 
two buses and two contactors) connected with different number of edges. The paths 
for each topology are generated by Python codes, and the Python outputs are shown 








Figure 15. Topologies with two generators, two buses and two contactors (1) with 
five edges; (2) with six edges; (3) with seven edges. The paths for each topology are 
shown below where R is the reliability level for each path-sets 
Topology in Figure 15 (1) Five Edges, it was compose of two generators, two buses 
and two contactors and was connected by five edges. This topology had four path-sets 
(i.e. g1 to b1, g1 to be, g2 to b1 and g2 to b2), and in each path-set had one path. The 
reliability value for each path-sets were 𝑅! =   𝑅! =   𝑅! =   𝑅! = 0.0012, which did 
not meet the FAA requirement (𝑅 = 10!!).  
Topology in Figure 15 (2) Six Edges, it was also compose by two generators, two 
buses and two contactors and was connected by six edges. The topology also had four 







were 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 1.47  𝑒 − 06 and 𝑅! = 2.089  𝑒 − 06, which did not meet the 
reliability requirement.  
Topology in Figure 15 (3) Seven Edges, it was compose by the same set of 
components as the topology in Figure 15 (1) and (2), but it was connected by seven 
edges. Since they are composed by same set of components, it computed four path-
sets as well. Each path-set had three or four paths, and the reliability values for each 
path were 𝑅! =   𝑅! =   𝑅! = 2.834  𝑒 − 09 and 𝑅! = 2.17  𝑒 − 012 which had meet 
the reliability level. By comparing the three topologies in Figure 15, we recognized 
that the same set of components, the topologies with more edges gives more options 
to the paths. The number of paths determines the reliability values.  
After we compared the topologies with the same set of components but with different 
number of edges, we compared the topologies with different set of components but 
with the same total number of components (i.e. three generators, one bus and two 
contactors or two generators, three buses and one contactor or one generator, two 










Figure 16. Topologies with same number of components (1) three generators, one bus 
and two contactors with nice edges; (2) two generators, three buses and one 
contactor with five edges; (3) one generator, two buses and three generators with 
twelve edges. The paths for each topology are shown below where R is the reliability 
level for each path-sets 
 
Topology in Figure 16 (1) consisted of three generators, one bus and two contactors. 
It was connect by its maximum number of edges, which were nice edges. This 
topology had three path-sets (i.e. g1 to b1, g2 to b1 and g3 to b1 where g1, g2 and g3 
were the input components and b1 is the output component). Each path-set had a total 
of eight paths. The reliability value for each path-set was 𝑅! =   𝑅! = 1.907  𝑒 − 23, 
which met the FAA reliability requirement (𝑅 = 10!! per flight hours). Topology in 







connect by its maximum number of edges, which were five edges. This topology had 
six path-sets (i.e. g1 to b1, g2 to b1, g3 to b1, g1 to b2, g2 to b2, g3 to b2 where g1, 
g2 and g3 were the input components and b1, b2 and b3 were the output 
components); each path-set had only one path. The reliability values for each paths-
sets were 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 0.0012, which did not met the FAA reliability 
requirement.  
Topology in Figure 16 (3), was composed by one generator, two buses and three 
contactors, and connected by its maximum number of edges, which were twelve 
edges. This topology had two path-sets (i.e. g1 to b1 and g1 to b2 where g1 was the 
input component and b1 and b2 were the output components), and each path-set had 
thirty-three paths. The reliability values for each path-sets were 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 4.78  𝑒 −
49, which met the FAA reliability requirement.  
By comparing the three topologies in Figure 16, we recognized that the topologies 
with the same total number of components (e.g. all topologies had six components), 
but with different number of each type of electric power components (e.g. one 
generator, two generator) could generate different maximum edges. Topologies with 
the highest number of paths computed would have higher reliability values.  Based on 
the edges constraints we applied on each component (i.e. no edges allowed between 
generator and generator, bus and bus, and generator and bus), contactor was the 
only one component that did not had any constraints. Therefore, contactor was the 
freest components that created more paths for each topology. Topologies had least 







it had the most number of contactor between the topologies in Figure 16. It computed 
the most paths between these three topologies.  
After we compared the topologies with the same number of components, we 
compared the topologies with the same number of edges but with different total 
number of components (i.e. six components and eight components with ten edges).  
 
 
Figure 17. Topologies with same number of edges: (1) Eight components - two 
generators, one bus and five contactors with ten edges; (2) Six components - two 
generators, one bus and three contactors with ten edges; the paths for each topology 
are shown below where R is the reliability level for each path-sets 
Topology in Figure 17 (1) consisted of two generators, one bus and five contactors. It 







b1 where g1and g2 were the input components and b1 was the output component), 
and each path-set had seven paths. The reliability values for each path-sets were 
𝑅! = 1.645  𝑒 − 20  and  𝑅! = 1.165  𝑒 − 20 , which both met the FAA reliability 
requirement.  
Topology in Figure 17 (2) contained two generators, one bus and three contactors, 
and it also connected by ten edges. This topology also had two path-sets (i.e. g1 to b1 
and g2 to b1 where g1and g2 were the input components and b1 was the output 
component), and each path-set had twelve paths. The reliability values for each path-
sets were 𝑅! = 𝑅! = 6.57𝑒 − 41 , which both also met the FAA reliability 
requirement.  
Comparing the topologies in Figure 17 with the assumption of two topologies with 
the same number of path-set (i.e. same number of input and output), we recognized 
that topologies with different total number of components (e.g. six and eight 
components) but with the same number of edges, the least number of components can 
generate more paths. With mean topologies with the same number of edges, the less 
number of component lean to compute more paths with higher reliability level. After 
comparing the different topologies for the set of six components, we move forward to 









Figure 18. Topologies with eight components 
 
Topologies in Figure 18 are with eight components, and the reliability levels are 
different in each topology. Both (1) and (4) have two generators, one bus and five 
contactors, both connected with ten edges. However, the reliability values are 
different for these two, even though they have the same number of edges and 
components. (2) and (5) have two generators, two buses and four contactors, both 
connected with nice edges. The reliability values for these two also different. (3) and 
(6) have two generators, three buses and three contactors, while (3) is connected with 







is higher than the topology connected with nine edges. Comparing (1) (2) and (3), the 
number of each type of electric power components are different, but the one with 
more edges lean to have a higher reliability values. This result is the same as the 
event that occurs with six components where the topologies have more edges to give 
higher reliability level. At the same time, topologies in Figure 18 also show us that, 
topologies with same features (same number edges and components), the reliability 
level could be different. This tells us that we cannot guarantees all topologies meet 
the reliability requirement with same features. As it shown in Figure 18 (2) and (5), 
while they have the same number of components and edges, the reliability level in (2) 
met the FAA requirement but (5) is not.  
In this chapter, we examine the set of combinations with six and eight components, 
while in each set of combinations. There is total number of possible combinations 
(e.g. for the six components events, there is total of ten sets). On each set of 
components, we applied different number of edges to each event. After going through 
all possible number of edges, we found that within the same set of component, the 
more edges we applied to the topologies, the higher the reliability level it got. Then, 
we looked into examples that had the same total number of components with the same 
edges number (as it show in Figure 15), but with different number of each type of 
components (e.g. one generator, two generator, or three generators). Within the 
assumption we established in this thesis (using the path-sets method and constraints 
for components), topologies with higher number of contactors have higher reliability 
values. After going through all the possible examples for six components, we did the 







or eight components, their behaviors are the same. In this procedure, we used the 
path-set method for our calculations. In the next section, we applied our proposed 
method to calculate the reliability values for the AC electrical systems architecture of 
the aircraft found in [46] as show in Figure 19.  
4.3 Application of the Proposed Method  
 
 
Figure 19. AC Electrical systems architecture for an aircraft [46] 
In this section, we take a single-line diagram as shows in Figure 19. We consider only 
the AC electrical systems in this architecture of an aircraft and we use the python 
code to generate candidate topologies. Each topology has a total of six generators, 








Figure 20. Topology for electric systems architecture of an aircraft 
 
The topology in Figure 20 is composed of thirty-six components. These include six 
generators, five buses and twenty-five contactors. Using the path-set method to 
calculate the reliability value for this topology, it produces thirty different path-sets. 
The reliability values of each path-set are shown in Table 2. As it can be seen from 
table 2, the reliability values of each path-set for topology in Figure 20 are different. 
It varies from 10!!" to 10!!" per flight hours, which mean all values meet the FAA 
requirement. Based on the result of this example, we were able to develop topologies 
and calculated the reliability levels for any electric power system by using our 
proposed method. Within the same electric power system, this can produce different 
topologies and each topology having different reliability levels. From the difference 
of the reliability level, we know which path can produce better reliability by 
comparing them to each other. One advantage of using our propose method to study 







electric power system and apply the topology with the highest reliability level to the 
design. In addition, an advantage of using path-set method to calculate the reliability 
level was that we were able to calculate all reliabilities between different input and 
outputs. For situation where we know which input and output the electricity is coming 
from and out, we can determine which path have higher reliability level by using 
path-set method.  
 
Table 2. Reliability Values for AC electric systems architecture of an aircraft 
Path-sets Reliability Values Path-sets Reliability Values 
From g1 to b1 2.070e-39 From g4 to b1 1.617e-41 
From g1 to b2 1.474e-28 From g4 to b2 3.224e-36 
From g1 to b3 4.217e-50 From g4 to b3 8.644e-17 
From g1 to b4 1.462e-56 From g4 to b4 1.037e-51 
From g1 to b5 1.229e-61 From g4 to b5 1.324e-56 
From g2 to b1 1.854e-31 From g5 to b1 1.617e-13 
From g2 to b2  4.706e-20 From g5 to b2 4.705e-20 
From g2 to b3 4.547e-59 From g5 to b3 1.147e-25 
From g2 to b4 4.973e-69 From g5 to b4 5.205e-54 
From g2 to b5 8.463e-74 From g5 to b5 5.205e-54 
From g3 to b1 3.661e-36 From g6 to b1 6.584e-54 
From g3 to b2 2.662e-25 From g6 to b2 3.085e-10 
From g3 to b3 7.6-6e-47 From g6 to b3 7.227e-16 
From g3 to b4 1.189e-41 From g6 to b4 2.884e-44 
From g3 to b5 9.589e-47 From g6 to b5 2.887e-44 
 
In conclusion, by applying our propose method, we were able to design an electric 
power system with many different topologies. Using the path-set method, we were 
able to calculate the reliability level of each path-set. Therefore, applying the path-set 









Chapter 5:  Control Synthesis 
 
 
The topologies we found in Chapter 4 will be linked to a control synthesis, which 
design a controller to actuate contactors in order to provide power to buses and loads. 
For any selected topology, we first went through all possible faults and looked for 
environment conditions where the reliability level still met the FAA reliability 
requirement even with failure errors.  We inputted a set of environment conditions to 
control synthesis and generated a controller that guaranteed the safety requirement.  
The main function of the controller is sensing and reacting to the faults of the electric 
power system. The controller must be designed to guarantee that the safety is satisfied 
under all possible faults [28, 35]. For any given topology, generators can be unhealthy 
or healthy. The aim in this chapter is to find a control protocol to correctly actuate 
contactors in order to direct power from generators to buses, and guarantee that buses 
will never be unpowered for more than a set period of time. The resulting controller is 
made up from a specification language. This formal specification language was linear 
temporal logic (LTL) [28, 33, 35].  
5.1 Linear Temporal Logic 
 
LTL is a type of temporal logic that is suitable for describing the properties in which 
temporal ordering of events is important. LTL is a language that reasons propositions 
over an infinite sequence of states. LTL’s main building block is the atomic 







status for generators 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 where {𝑔1 = ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦}, and {𝑔2 = 𝑢𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦} are 
atomic propositions [43].  
LTL includes Boolean connectors: negation (¬), disjunction (˅), conjunction (^), 
material implication (→), and two basic temporal operators: next (Ο) and until (𝓤). 
By combining these operators, it is possible to specify requirements widely on the 
desired behavior of a system and environment assumptions. Formulas involving other 
operators can be derived from these basic ones, including always (□) and eventually 
(◊) [33, 35, 36]. Example of LTL includes invariance (□  𝐩), reachability (□ ◊ 𝐩), 
recurrence (◊□p), response {□ (p→q)}, and next step response {□ (p→ Ο ◊ q)}.  
Next, we review the formal method to link all the specifications to control synthesis.  
To synthesize the control logic that guarantees the reliability requirement, we will use 
a Python-based coded software, called the TuLiP [18, 33].  
5.2 Introduction to TuLiP 
 
The Temporal Logic Planning (TuLiP) toolbox is a collection of Python-based code 
used for automatic synthesis of correct-by-construction embedded control software 
[28, 33]. TuLiP is designed to synthesize discrete-state controllers for hybrid systems 
operating in an uncertain environment. There are three primary steps in using TuLiP. 
First, constructs a finite transition system (𝒟) that serves as an abstract model of S, 
where S is the state space of the continuous component of the system, which typically 
has infinitely many states. Second, it synthesizes a discrete planner that computes a 
discrete plan satisfying the specification φ based on the abstract, finite state model 𝒟. 







Synthesis can be considered to be a two-player game, where the environment tries to 
make the system go into a “bad” state, and the controller tries to guarantee all 
requirements are met. Let 𝑠 = 𝑒,𝑝   𝜖  𝑑𝑜𝑚   𝐸   ×  𝑑𝑜𝑚  (𝑃)  be the states of the 
system. Consider a LTL specification 𝜑 of assume guarantee form 
𝜑 =   𝜑  !   →   𝜑  !  ,                                                         (1)   
 where 𝜑  !   is the conjunction of LTL specification that characterizes the assumptions 
on the environments and 𝜑  !    is the conjunction of LTL specification that 
characterizes the system requirements. TuLiP generates a finite automaton that 
represents all possible states of the systems and their transitions.  If a strategy exists 
for the system to satisfy the specification, such as a controller exists, this means the 
specification 𝜑 is realizable [28, 33, 35, 36, 45]. 
5.3 Case Study Using TuLiP  
 
The topology in Figure 19 was one of the topologies that was generated from the 
previous chapter. Using this sample topology, we linked it to control synthesis. For 
the sample topology, we first looked into the environment assumptions. For 
simplicity purpose, we considered that generators were the only type of variable 
capable of failing. Additional specifications were needed to instruct TuLiP on how to 
generate a controller for the sample topology. With all the specifications, a controller 
automaton was created. Each states in the automaton activity diagram shows the 
transitions behavior between each states. Lastly, for topology that is unrealizable, we 











Figure 21. Topology with two generators, two buses and two contactors connected by 
eight edges 
 
Since there is no control over the environment variables, the environment 
assumptions guarantee the system’s feasibility. For a selected topology (shown in 
Figure 21), after going through all the possible faults in the existing examples, the 
path-sets (or the system reliability level) in each topology accommodate any possible 
combination of faults with a reliability level higher than 10!! per flight hours are 
very few. For instance, the selected topology allows only two possible faults with 
reliability levels higher than 10!!  per flight hours. Therefore, we lowered the 
reliability level to 10!! per flight hours. This way we could have more system 
variable activities in the environment specifications.  
For selected topology, there are four total different path-sets. Given the four different 
environment equations, this can be written in specifications for the system variables 











𝜑!! =  → ( 𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 0  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
    ˅   𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 0  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
              ˅   𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 0  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 0  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 0  
𝜑!! =  → ( 𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 0  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
˅   𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 0  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
˅   𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 0  ˄  𝑏1 = 0  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1 ) 
𝜑!! =  → ( 𝑔1 = 0  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
˅   𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 0  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
˅   𝑔1 = 0  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 0  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1 ) 
𝜑!! =  → ( 𝑔1 = 0  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
˅   𝑔1 = 1  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 1  ˄  𝑏2 = 0  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1  
˅   𝑔1 = 0  ˄  𝑔2 = 1  ˄  𝑏1 = 0  ˄  𝑏2 = 1  ˄  𝑐1 = 1  ˄  𝑐2 = 1 ) 
 
Equation (2) to (5) are the outputs of the topology python code, where each 
specification represents a fault that occurs - but the reliability still meets the FAA 
requirement. Since there is a total of four path-sets for the selected topology, we have 
four environment assumption equations. Within these four environment equations 
(shown in equation 2 – 5), path-set one 𝜑!! allows five different fails while the other 
three allow only three fails.  For example, as show in equation (5), if g1 fail, but g2, 
b1, b2 and c2 function regularly without any errors, the electric power system meets 
the FAA reliability requirement. Secondly, if b2 fails, but g1, g2, b1, c1 and c2 
function regularly without any errors, the electric power system also meets the FAA 







regularly without any errors, the electric power systems also meet the FAA reliability 
requirements.  
In control synthesis, for simplicity, we consider generators (i.e. g1 and g2) to be 
capable of failing. There are three acceptable environment behaviors for generators 
which including: g1 =1, g2 = 1; g1 = 1, g2 = 0 and g1 = 0, g2 = 0, where 1 = healthy 
and 0 = unhealthy. Written in LTL, the environment assumptions from equation (2) to 
(5) can reduce to the following:  
𝜑! = □  { 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑔2 = 1 ∨    𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑔2 = 0 ∨    𝑔1 = 0   ∧ 𝑔2 = 1 }                    (6) 
The system variables are b1, b2, c1 and c2, where they can take values of 0 or 1. For 
buses, a value of 0 means the bus in unpowered, while a value of 1 signifies that the 
bus is powered. A contactor with a value of 1 mean the contactors in closed. A value 
of 0 means the contactor is open. 
The power state for buses depends on healthy conditions of a generator. Buses are 
powered if there is a path between a bus and generator, and if all components along 
the path are healthy or closed. The specifications for initial grantees states for buses 
powered are 
𝜑!! = □ 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1 ∨ 𝑔1 = 1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 ∨    𝑔2 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1                                       
∨ 𝑔2 = 1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 → 𝑏1 = 1                                                                                                                     (7) 
𝜑!! = □ 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1 ∨ 𝑔1 = 1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 ∨    𝑔2 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1                                       













(10)                          
On the other hand, if none of the above conditions hold, the buses will be unpowered. 
This requirement is expressed as 
□  ¬  { 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1 ∨ 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 ∨ 𝑔2 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1
∨ 𝑔2 = 1   ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 →    𝑏1 = 0 } 
□  ¬  { 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1 ∨ 𝑔1 = 1   ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 ∨ 𝑔2 = 1   ∧ 𝑐1 = 1
∨ 𝑔2 = 1   ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 →    𝑏2 = 0 . 
We consider essential to be connected to safety-critical loads, and it can be never 
unpowered more than three time steps. Each transition represent an increment of time 
step, it will reset to zero when is powered. The safety specification for buses can be 
expressed as 
□  {  (𝑏1 = 0) → (𝚶   𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_1+ 1 )}                        (11) 
□  {  (𝑏1 = 1) → (𝚶   𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_1 = 0 )}                                                                            (12)  
□  {  (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_1 <= 3)                                                 (13) 
□  {  (𝑏2 = 0) → (𝚶   𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_2+ 1 )}                        (14) 
□  {  (𝑏2 = 1) → (𝚶   𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_2 = 0 )}                                                                              (15)  
□  {  (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_2 <= 3)                                                 (16) 
Paralleling can occur if there exists a live path that connected all generators. To avoid 
paralleling, we never want to close all the contactors at the same time, which will lead 
to a live path between generators. This specification can expressed as   
□  {  ¬   𝑐1 = 1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 1 }                                               (17) 
For a sample topology, there is a total of two generators and two buses, while each 







the contactors connected to that generator will become open.  This specification can 
expressed as following  
□ 𝑔1 = 0 →    𝑐1 = 0   ∧ 𝑐2 = 0 ,                                          (18) 
𝑔2 = 0 →    𝑐1 = 0   ∧ 𝑐2 = 0 .                                          (19) 
When Equations (18) and (19) holds this specification is unrealizable. In order to 
provide power to the buses, contactors must be closed. For the selected topology, if 
we want buses to be powered, we cannot have any generators to fail. We will address 
this issue later in this chapter. Thus, we deleted the specifications shown in (18) and 
(19) where g1 or g2 is unhealthy so that we can synthesize a controller for the 
selected topology. The resulting automaton is shown in Figure 22.  
As shown in Figure 22, the status variables for generators are g1 and g2, and the 
status variable for buses are b1 and b2 while the status variables for contactors are c1 
and c2. Each state has a successor, which defines where the controller can transition 
depending on the current state. There are a total of 13 states where each state has four 
successors. For example, state 0 with successors: 1, 2, 3, and 4 means that the 
controller can transit from state 0 to state 1, 2, 3, or 4. For state 1, with successors: 5, 
6, 7 and 8, it means that the controller can transit from state 1 to state 5, 6, 7, 8. 
Looking at the status for c2, we find out that c2 is always equal to 0 (open). In order 
to get more interesting behaviors for contractors, we add new specifications to the 
environment, it can written as  








By adding this new specification, a new automaton results as shown in Figure 23. 
With this new specification, depending on the status, c2 now can be open and closed. 
Comparing the two resulting automaton, the resulting automaton in Figure 21 creates 
more states. It has a total of 16 states.  
 


















5.4 Redesign Topologies  
 
As previously discussed in previous section, when generators (g1 or g2) become 
unhealthy, the contactors that are connected to that generator will become open.  For 
selected topology in this chapter, when g1 or g2 fails, both contactors become open. 
Thus, buses cannot be powered and this is unrealizable. In situations like this, we 
have to go back and modify the topology, so it can guarantee all buses are powered. 
The first step we take is to increase the number of edges, but this does not solve the 




Figure 24. New topologies with two generators, two buses and four contactors, 








Topologies in Figure 24 are composed with two generators, two buses, and four 
contactors, connected with twelve edges. For this topology, if g1 fails, c1 = c4 = 0, b1 
and b2 can be powered from 𝑔2.     The path would be 𝑔2   → 𝑐3   → 𝑏1  𝑜𝑟  𝑔2   →
𝑐3   → 𝑏2. If g2 fails, c1 and c3 becomes open, b1 and b2 can power from 𝑔1, and the 
path would be  𝑔1   → 𝑐4   → 𝑏1  𝑜𝑟  𝑔1   → 𝑐4   → 𝑏2. 
 
Figure 25. New topologies with two generators, two buses and six contactors, 
connected with sixteen edges. 
For the topology in Figure 25, if  g1  fails, then  c1   =   c5 = 0, and b1 and b2 can be 
powered from 𝑔2,  the path would be  𝑔2 → 𝑐4   → 𝑏1  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑔2 → 𝑐4   → 𝑏2. If g2 fail, 
c2 = c4 = 0, and b1 and b2 can be powered from𝑔1,  the path would be 𝑔1   → 𝑐5   →
𝑏1  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑔1   → 𝑐1   → 𝑏2.  
Comparing the topologies between Figure 24 and 25, both have given a satisfied 







Figure 25 has to bring in extra components and edges. Extra components and edges 
increased the reliability level but in the same time increased the total cost. Good 
topologies are the ones balanced in cost and reliability level. Therefore, topology in 
Figure 24 has more advantage than topology in Figure 25. From the above topologies, 
we know that by increasing the number of contactors, it creates more paths for the 
electricity to flow from generators to buses. With enough edges and components, it 
increases the reliability level and guarantees the safety of the electric power systems. 
For topology that meet the reliability level but is unrealizable, we have to redesign it 

















This thesis investigated ways to analyze topologies for the MEA electric power 
system by using different reliability methodologies. The aim was to select a reliable 
number and connectivity of electric power components that could produce a reliable 
reliability value. Reliable reliability values were the reliability values that met the 
FAA required reliability level at 10!! flight per hours and had the lowest total cost.  
We demonstrated the traditional and new proposed methodologies in finding the 
reliability level for the electric power system. In the traditional method, we looked at 
the reliability values for each electric power component and calculated their 
reliability level. In our proposed method, we worked in the opposite direction and 
looked at the overall reliability level for electric power systems and generated 
topologies that met the reliability level. We used NetworkX, a Python software 
language, to compute candidate topologies. Each topology was composed of nodes 
and edges. Where nodes represented electric power components and edges 
represented the connections between each component.  We applied a complex system 
reliability calculation method called the ‘path-set method’ to compute reliability 
levels for the candidate topologies.  
Finally, we used TuLiP as the tool to automatically synthesize a controller that 
satisfied the safety requirement. The aim was create a controller that guarantees buses 
can be powered when failure occur. The formal language used to formulate the 







formalizing a set of environmental conditions and system specifications to synthesize 
a controller automaton for a selected topology.  
6.2 Future Work 
 
Methodologies used in this thesis scaled down the number of electric power 
components and simplified changes in the reliability values. In future, we can 
increase the number and type of the electric power components. Having multiple 
reliability values for each type of electric power components definitely changes the 
reliability level for the electric power system. Furthermore, we also plan to expand 
the environment variables in TuLiP from the current two variables to four or more.  
Procedures input in the initial state and environment assumptions are complicated, 
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